Visuo-spatial neglect has long been thought of as a disorder of attention, but a recent experiment shows that, when images from the left side are reflected by a mirror into the 'good' hemispace, neglect patients behave as if the object were behind, or in, the mirroras if the left side of their world did not 'exist'.
Understandably, then, the neglect patient's attitude to this side of space is of great interest to neuropsychologists -hence the interest in a recent experiment by Ramachandran and colleagues [1] . Using a mirror, they were able to examine what happens when a neglect patient is inadvertently required to gaze directly upon the left side -a side towards which they hold such remarkable inclinations. Their bizarre responses tell us something of the way in which we deal with contradictions of experience, and also reveal a central theoretical issue about the nature of the disorder of 'neglect'.
The Ramachandran et al. paper [1] describes four patients who suffer from a disorder known as unilateral hemispatial neglect. This neuropsychological deficit occurs most commonly and severely in patients with right hemisphere lesions, and involves a failure to attend to objects located to their left side (see [2] for review). Such patients draw only the right half of the flower they are copying, eat food only from the right half of the plate, and shave or apply lipstick only to the right half of their face. Is the disorder caused by a failure to 'see' the left half of the world? Certainly, there are disorders in which the patient is truly 'blind' for a visual half-field (hemianopia). However, the disorder of neglect does not follow from an inability to 'see' one half of the visual world -there are patients who have neglect but no hemianopia, and patients who have hemianopia but no neglect [3] , with the two disorders following from brain lesions at different sites.
What, then, is the nature of the disorder in cases of neglect? It is clear that, at least some of the time, such patients can see things on their left -if the object attracts their attention, perhaps by moving or flashing brightly. In practice, however, they are seldom aware of the left half of their world. The currently accepted interpretation of their deficit is that the attentional resources of such patients are easily captured by objects on their right-hand side, and that they seem unable to withdraw (or 'disengage') their attention from objects on the right in order to attend to the left hemispace [4] . Thus, neglect is generally regarded as a disorder of attention. We should note, however, that some patients with neglect show related disturbances in the domain of action, having difficulty moving their limbs into the left hemispace (a directional hypokinesia).
There appear to be some attitudinal, or 'emotional', factors that co-occur with the neglect disorder. As in many other areas of psychology, such matters of affect have received far less attention. As we shall see, however, these factors are essential if we are to understand the work of Ramachandran et al. [1] . Thus, neglect patients frequently appear unaware of their deficit, even when confronted with direct evidence of their neglect. They do not attempt to compensate for their deficit, commonly failing to check for the left half of objects, and often 'losing' objects in the left hemispace.
In cases of simple hemianopia, where the patient cannot directly observe objects in the left visual field, patients are commonly aware that they might be missing objects on that side. To compensate for this restriction of vision, they generally swivel their head to the left, to view the 'previously left' side of the world with their (intact) right visual field. In contrast, many patients with neglect have difficulty even imagining objects in the left hemispace. They seem unaware that they are missing objects on the left, and might be argued to be unaware of very existence of a left side of space.
The patients also have an unusual attitude towards their own body. They are commonly paralysed down the left side (hemiplegia), but they frequently deny this disability (anosognosia). When directly asked to move the (hemiplegic) limb, they might fob the examiner off with an excuse, such as "I must have tired it out using it earlier". And patients with hemispatial neglect sometimes even experience a profound hatred towards the left side (misoplegia [5] ). They may personify the left limb, call it names -the nuisance' -or physically abuse the left side.
From a strictly cognitive perspective, therefore, these patients fail to attend to the left side of space, and they also show some unusual attitudes towards the left. But investigations of the 'emotional' aspects of the deficit have received far less prominence in the literature. The recent experiments of Ramachandran et al. [1] offer us an opportunity to see how far a simple 'attentional' account of the deficit might take us. In these experiments, the patient was offered an external aid to overcome the purely cognitive difficulties of lateral attention -a mirror was placed on the right of the patient, and aligned obliquely so that objects placed on their left side would be reflected to appear in their 'good' visual field. Viewed from the 'attentional' perspective, we might perhaps expect the patient to say "Ah... there the object is. I couldn't see it before, because I can't attend to the left -thanks for reflecting it across for me". But the responses of the patients tested by Ramachandran et al. [1] were entirely different.
The patients not only failed to reach leftwards for the objects, but they repeatedly banged into the mirror, or searched behind it, making comments such as "it's not in my reach" (though it was) and "it's behind the mirror". One patient claimed that the object was "inside the mirror". These bizarre findings are not reports of isolated incidents. The experiment was carried out (on the four patients) a total of 28 times, always with the same result, with similar behaviour continuing for some 20 seconds on each trial. Though otherwise lucid, the patients seemed unable to deduce intellectually where the object ought to be, and hence the way that mirrors 'work'. These findings might well be interpreted as providing intriguing evidence of the attitudes that such patients feel towards the left hemispace. Thus, their denial of the 'existence' of the left hemispace is so profound that it continues, even when the purely attentional difficulties of looking left have been overcome. One interpretation offered by Ramachandran et al. [1] is that "since the reflection is in the mirror, the pen must be on my left. But the left does not exist in my world, therefore it must be inside the mirror".
Certainly, these findings seem incredible, and doubtless the sceptical reader has thought of some reasons why these conclusions might not be justified. Hence -as in all good single-case neuropsychology -the authors offer additional details which serve to counter, in advance, any questions on the part of the doubtful reader. First, as alluded to above, the patients were not demented, aphasic or amnesic. Indeed, in an interesting turn of phrase for a publication from the University of California, they are described as "quite conversationally fluent (at least by American standards)"! Second, one might wonder whether the patients had failed to understand the instructions, or recognise the mirror? Ramachandran et al. [1] make it clear that they specifically asked each patient what the examiner was holding, and each correctly named it as a mirror. Each was asked to describe an object -spectacles, lipstick and so onwhile looking in the mirror, and did so correctly. Third, it might be argued that the patients did wish to move left, but that they were unable to do so because of difficulties moving into the left hemispace (the directional hypokinesia discussed above). To counter this, Ramachandran et al. [1] asked the patients to "point as far to your left as possible", which showed that they had more than sufficient range of movement to reach the objects. They were also asked to follow instructions such as "touch your left shoulder", which showed that they could accurately direct actions within the left hemispace (at least in relation to their body). Note, also, that a hypokinesia-based argument does not accord with patient descriptions of the objects as being "behind the mirror" or "inside the mirror".
Lastly, it might be imagined that, although they could still name the object as a mirror, they had somehow forgotten the way in which mirrors 'work'. To counter this, Ramachandran et al. [1] repositioned the mirror so that it lay more-or-less in the coronal plane (facing the patient). The object was placed above their right shoulder, with the mirror slightly offset so that patient could view the object only in the mirror. Thus, the object was placed within their right (good) hemispace, but out of direct sight. Under these conditions, three of the four patients moved directly to the real position of the object from the very first trial (in the case of a single patient there were a few initial trials in which the old 'mirror-banging' approach was tried, before they spontaneously moved to pick up the real object). Thus, although the sceptic might imagine that the patients had lost the realisation that a mirror offers a 'dual representation' of an object, they made it clear from their actions that they understood the fact that mirrors reflect light from a different spatial location, and that they knew where this location was.
I have only a single objection to the Ramachandran et al. [1] paper, relating to the title rather than the content. They suggest a new term for the disorder -'mirror agnosia'. The term 'agnosia' is commonly used in neuropsychology, and refers to a disorder in which the patient has sufficient intellectual and sensory capacities potentially to allow them to identify an object, and yet they fail to recognise it. Thus, in prosopagnosia, patients know that they are looking at a face, but fail to recognise it as the face of, say, Bill Clinton. By analogy, 'mirror agnosia' should be a rather specific disorder in which the patient sees a flat rectangular object in front of them, but fails to recognise it as a mirror. Clearly, Ramachandran et al. [1] did not intend this use of the term. Is it then a 'mirror-image agnosia', in which they see an image, but fail to recognise that it comes from a mirror? This still fails to explain the good performances in cases where the target object was placed over the right shoulder. Are we then reduced to the even more cumbersome term 'hemispatial mirror-image agnosia'? Importantly, one might also argue that the disorder of 'finding the location of objects reflected in mirrors' is not the fundamental, or core, deficit in these cases. It seems far more parsimonious to interpret the bizarre behaviour of these patients as yet another manifestation of hemispatial neglect, perhaps not worthy of a specific name. A final objection is that there is already a disorder of mirror-image discrimination, quite different to that described above, and perhaps equally worthy of the term 'mirror agnosia'. Here, patients appear to be able to see objects well enough (in either hemispace), but are unable to discriminate between mirror-image objects [6] [7] [8] . We [8] almost suggested the term 'enantiomorphagnosia' for the deficit of one such patient -described last year in Current Biology [9] -but despaired that people would ever learn to pronounce it.
Debates about terminology are not, however, the central concern of science. Regardless of nomenclature, the Ramachandran et al. [1] experiments offer a fascinating insight into the extent to which contradictions within experience appear to distort our knowledge of the properties of objects. The impossibility -from the patient's perspective -of objects existing on the left leaves them in the position of having to square this 'knowledge' with their understanding of the properties of mirrors. These findings raise the question of which kinds of evidence are required in order to prove existence, perhaps moving such issues beyond the realm of armchair speculation. In this vein, Ramachandran et al. [1] suggest the term 'experimental epistemology' for this new, scientific, approach to some ancient philosophical problems.
